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UMass Selects a Elements of a
New President Search Strategy
Richard A. Hogarty
The selection of a new university president, an event of major importance in academic
life, is usually filled with tensions on the part of those concerned about its outcome.
The 1992 presidential search at the University of Massachusetts exemplifies such ten-
sions. There were mixed reactions to the overall performance. When they finished
reviewing candidates, the search committee had eliminated all but Michael K. Hooker,
who, they deemed, has the necessary competence, vision, and stature for the task. The
main conflict centered on the question of "process" versus "product. " The trustees
rejoiced in what they considered an impressive choice, while many faculty were angered
over what they considered a terrible process. Each side was dismayed at the others be-
havior. This study focuses on the search itself and the leadership potential the new
president brings to the office.
In
early December of 1991, the trustees of the University of Massachusetts
launched a six-month search for a new president to head its five-campus system.
Their efforts went beyond merely filling a vacancy: their long-term objective was to
find someone who could lead the institution to the levels of strength and excellence
that would turn it into the top-ranked university envisioned by the special blue-
ribbon panel that had drafted the Saxon Commission Report in March 1989. Their
more immediate objective was to find someone who could help them resolve their
fiscal crisis and deal with racial divisions on campus.
The criteria developed by the search committee called for a leader of stature and
vision, an institution builder, an individual of personal and intellectual integrity. They
were looking for a successor to Elbert K. Fretwell, who had served as interim presi-
dent for slightly more than a year. He had been recruited to replace president Joseph
Duffey, whose sudden departure in March 1991 had left the board of trustees eager to
fill the position temporarily or at least until they could find a more permanent re-
placement. Fretwell, nearing the end of his career, had filled the position on a stop-
gap basis. With nine months of his incumbency remaining, he had been expected to
step down from office at the end of August 1992.
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Comparing this search for a permanent president with those which preceded it,
one finds some striking similarities and differences. From start to finish, the trustees
went about their work efficiently and expeditiously, announcing the appointment of
Michael K. Hooker as the new president in late May 1992. Curiously enough, the
results of the search produced mixed reactions, if not opposite conclusions, especially
when it came to drawing distinctions between process and outcome. As events would
verify, the trustees were genuinely pleased with the outcome, regarding Michael
Hooker as a superb choice. Although many faculty members liked the selection and
seemed reasonably satisfied with Hooker, they were disturbed by the search process,
which they saw as closed, secretive, unilateral, and undemocratic. But more about
that later.
This article examines four separate but interrelated questions. First, why did
the Hooker search work as well as it did from the perspective of the trustees and
the members of the search committee? Second, what experience, if any, contributed
to the outcome? Third, why did the faculty object to the search process? Fourth,
what led the participants to reach such a high level of consensus about their final
choice? Suitably explored, these and similar questions should shed light on presi-
dential searches in general, and on the Michael Hooker selection in particular.
Before their memories faded and while the evidence was still fresh and discern-
ible, I interviewed most of those who were involved in the search. They included all
the trustees and faculty members who served on the search committee, plus students,
alumni, faculty governance officials, two chancellors, the chairman of the board of
trustees, and the new president. As a consequence, I have incorporated much of the
information obtained from these interviews into this narrative and used it to interpret
what actually happened. In addition, I examined all the pertinent public documents
related to the search.
Most studies indicate that there is no perfect way to conduct a presidential search.
Nor is there an ideal model that has universal application. What works at an elite
private institution, for example, does not necessarily work at a public one, since the
public nature of the search exposes it to sunshine laws, extensive press coverage, and
the vicissitudes of state politics. Moreover, the competing forces involve people with
conflicting interests and human frailties. They are usually engaged in a group process
that is, by definition, less than perfect. Division and conflict are ordinary and in-
evitable, as are randomness and unpredictability.
Although the Hooker search exceeded ordinary expectations, it could not avoid
the contentious group conflict and tensions that usually characterize such searches.
These tensions, as we shall see, revolved around issues dealing with affirmative ac-
tion, openness, confidentiality, the selection of the search committee, the balancing of
process and outcome, campus visits by the candidates, and the enduring debate as to
whether a "good search" produces a "good president."
Despite the tension, the UMass experiencee is important because it illustrates that
presidential searches do indeed matter and that, if they are organized properly, they
can identify the most appropriate person for the institution. The results of the search,
however, were by no means limited to the choice of a new president. Interestingly,
the search process afforded a unique opportunity for the university to examine its
priorities and values and to consider the kind of leadership it desires. Achieving such
a consensus was at best a delicate task, but it served to legitimate the new president
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and to smooth his transition into office. Ultimately, most of these results were
achieved in this particular case. What follows, then, is a reconstruction of the search
in all its essential detail.
The Changing Faces of UMass
The UMass community is composed of many different people and many different
parts. UMass was founded in 1863 as a small agricultural school that specialized in
teaching scientific farming methods and researching problems related to growing
crops and animal husbandry. The original aims and directions of UMass have
changed dramatically through the years, but the aims of the School of Agriculture
remain basically the same. By the turn of the century, nine field research and experi-
ment stations were set up across the state to provide technical assistance to farm
families through the cooperative extension service. Secluded in the farmlands of the
majestic Connecticut River Valley, the original site at Amherst was UMass 's only
campus for the first hundred years of the school's existence. But this idyllic campus
setting is largely a memory frozen in the past as its contemporary high-rise dor-
mitories dwarf the surrounding landscape.
Affectionately known as Mass Aggie, the agricultural school was elevated to a
state college in 1931 and to a full- fledged university in 1947. Shortly thereafter,
with the return of numerous World War II veterans eager to obtain a college educa-
tion with their GI benefits, UMass/Amherst grew considerably as the demand for ad-
mission expanded in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s. Many more professors
were needed to teach the large numbers of students.
By the early 1960s, with the baby-boom generation reaching college age, two
urban branch campuses were established in the cities of Boston and Worcester. The
former was created as a nonresidential commuter campus, the latter as a state medi-
cal school. Within this state university system, the emergence of newer metropolitan
universities in the population centers of Massachusetts have threatened the premier
position of UMass/Amherst, whose academic rank is as one of the so-called public
Ivies. Still the largest campus, Amherst evokes the most intense alumni loyalties and
takes intercollegiate athletics, especially basketball, seriously.
Following the recommendations of the special blue-ribbon Saxon Commission, the
University of Massachusetts system was enlarged in September 1991 from three cam-
puses to five. At the same time, two separate and distinct public universities at
Dartmouth and Lowell were merged with those at Amherst, Boston, and Worcester.
As a result, the newly configured institution has become a modern comprehensive
university spread across the commonwealth. Managing this complicated system is
no easy task: it employs approximately twelve thousand faculty, professional, and
classified staff, and its overall budget is close to a billion dollars. Collectively, the
five campuses enroll nearly fifty-nine thousand students, who reflect in varying de-
gree the ethnic, racial, and gender composition of the larger society. Besides the nor-
mal teenage high school graduates, working adults, single parents, elders, military
veterans, and large numbers of foreign students have added significantly to its
diversity. In the early 1990s, as the demographics of higher education continued to
change, the UMass system was still in the process of defining itself.
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The Role of the UMass President
As the state university has grown and greatly expanded its programs, the job of its
chief executive officer has become much more complicated. More diverse groups
and constituencies are sending more messages, making more demands, and applying
greater pressure. The job is not only complex and difficult, but also multidimen-
sional. A modern president is, among other things, chief administrator, chief
negotiator, chief of external relations, and symbolic and ceremonial head of the
academic community. The person holding the position wears several hats and per-
forms many duties, ranging from preparing the budget to fund-raising and defusing
explosive racial incidents on campus. 1
As its most visible advocate and roving ambassador of good will, the president rep-
resents the university at various ceremonial functions and important civic events.
More to the point, he or she plays a vital role in formulating and implementing the
central questions of university policy. The task requires someone who is relatively
sophisticated about academic life and possesses the vision and leadership ability to
advance its mission. The effective leader must also be equipped not only to com-
prehend a broad range of issues but also to speak clearly about them.
Strengthening the public university and actively marshaling its resources is the es-
sential leadership role of the president. In dealing with state politicians and the
media, the president plays an indispensable role in providing needed protection and
lending coherence and meaning to its mission. Defending UMass along these lines
is a constant struggle, one in which the incumbent must at times be prepared to do
battle. In their landmark study of presidential searches, Judith McLaughlin and David
Riesman describe the executive function as follows:
In the public sector of American higher education, college and university presi-
dents must defend their institutions daily against the attacks and incursions that
will make them mediocre. At the same time, they must lobby for the public fund-
ing necessary to maintain and improve their capacities for research and teaching.
In both endeavors, the president is a central figure whose actions can enhance
public relations or threaten the curtailment of public support.
It is obvious, of course, that UMass presidents must be inclined to assert them-
selves — to feel sure that they ought to lead — if they are to be effective. This is a
matter of values, of approach to political realities, and different presidents have
manifested different styles. Some have aspired to no more than a modest overseer's
role. Others have felt that the only route to administrative success, given the political
conditions of the state, is to stir no fuss, to anger no one, to play it safe and wait for
promotion as the head of a major institution somewhere else. Still other presidents,
for example, John Lederle (1960-1970) and Robert Wood (1970-1977), have firmly
believed that it was their duty to step out front and insist on leading.
It helps to remember that these presidents, like other public managers, are mortal
humans with diverse strengths and weaknesses. As Duane Lockard, an observer of
New England state politics, has aptly said:
Too often officials are rendered into abstractions by lumping all occupants of
offices together and ignoring the tremendous variations that exist among human
beings. We sometimes forget that some individuals inspire confidence and can
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win loyalty and support where others cannot; that some can comprehend complex
situations and see the interrelationships of problems and people and plan coor-
dinated approaches accordingly while others can neither comprehend nor plan or
explain. An individual lacking the qualities of leadership occupying an office well-
endowed with formal authority may achieve remarkably little. An official who has
formal power and leadership qualities but who is disinclined to use the authority
he possesses will simply not be comparable to one of equal talents (or perhaps of
lesser talents) who is determined to get action. The abilities, attitudes, personal
traits, values — even the personal appearance — of individuals condition their
effectiveness as leaders.
These human differences assume even greater importance when one takes into
account the role of the public university president, for the kinds of tasks to be per-
formed require prodigious effort, energy, and patience in addition to ineffable per-
sonal qualities and abilities. Because the job is so demanding and survival so
precarious, it is hard to find qualified people who are willing to take on such an
arduous task. This is especially true during a period of economic austerity, when
times are hard and the erratic fluctuation of rising costs and falling revenues
squeezes the budget and leaves the president with little room to maneuver.
In setting objectives or trying to advance them persuasively under such adverse
conditions, the chief executive finds his or her options severely limited. There is
simply not enough money available to sustain the level of service. Operating under
these constraints, rational decision making forces an executive to engage in down-
sizing the internal organization and reallocating its resources. Difficult decisions
are necessary to keep its fiscal house in order and maintain a robust and responsible
institution.
The Fiscal Crisis and Faculty Morale
Between 1988 and 1991, UMass suffered the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression as state funding declined precipitously. Suddenly, with the economy
faltering, its immediate financial picture looked terrible, the long-run future bleak. In
a protracted series of deep cuts that extended over this four-year period, 30 percent
of its budget was slashed. These drastic cutbacks damaged faculty morale and
reduced teaching positions, student enrollment, financial aid, library acquisitions, and
administrative staff. Some academic programs were eliminated, resulting in many
employee layoffs.4 Hiring freezes were accompanied by a policy of no pay raises.
At one point the faculty and staff found themselves furloughed for a brief period. As
these budgetary pressures mounted, the constant refrain heard on campus was to do
more with less money.
To make up for the shortfalls, it became necessary to tap private foundations and
corporate sources for additional dollars. The university also found that it had to in-
crease student tuitions and fees substantially. But the crippled economy could not be
blamed for all its woes. Some resulted from public dissatisfaction and the loss of
legislative support. The public relations problems, partly the product of diminishing
revenues, were fed by disparities between initial claims and actual performance. Yet
one public opinion survey, conducted in Massachusetts in the late fall of 1989, found
that 68 percent of the respondents would be willing to pay higher taxes if the money
13
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raised were earmarked for the support of public colleges and universities.5 By early
December 1991, however, UMass financing seemed to be as much at risk as it had
been four years earlier.
The Legacy of Previous Searches
At this point we have to take a few steps backward in time to see the connection of
previous searches, which is essential to reconstructing the story. Between 1970 and
1992, the University of Massachusetts had five presidents. The searches that
produced them were fraught with difficulty in one form or another. When Robert
Wood was selected as the first system president in 1970, the trustees interrupted the
work of an ongoing search committee and unilaterally imposed their choice. As the
appointing authority, they saw the selection of the chief executive officer as their ex-
clusive prerogative. Such an imposed choice, however, created turmoil and consterna-
tion. The intervention by the trustees infuriated the faculty at the flagship campus in
Amherst. Bungling marred the whole episode. The selection of Bob Wood immedi-
ately became a flaming symbol of an old-boy network.
On assuming the presidency, Wood was aggressive in asserting control over
external as well as internal affairs. Within relatively short order, his personal style
and mode of operation made him a figure of extreme controversy. He insisted on
micromanaging at the campus level. This posture, coupled with the concentration of
power in the president's office, did not sit well with the campus chancellors. They
chafed at what they perceived as Wood's meddling. Before long, they were compet-
ing against each other over issues of internal organization and resource allocation.
Wood won the power struggle, but the costs were high. It eventually led to the resig-
nation of both chancellors — Oswald Tippo at Amherst and Francis Broderick at
Boston. Whatever the problems Wood may have had along these lines, they should
not be allowed to obscure his many notable accomplishments and presidential
effectiveness.
In the wake of this rebellion, the trustees adopted a new policy on university
governance in the spring of 1973. Recommended by a multicampus committee
headed by Professor Robert Wellman, the policy gave faculty exclusive power over
academic matters. The Wellman Report also outlined areas of "primary respon-
sibility" for initiating action and called for some form of shared governance with
faculty and students. The mood of the times had a great deal to do with bringing
about such reform. As Riesman and McLaughlin remind us:
Civil rights activists and anti-war protesters brought issues of student power into
the struggles for campus hegemony. The temporal juxtaposition of the increasing
leverage of faculty and the visibility of student revolts had the consequence of
developing a norm in which not only faculty members were included on presiden-
tial search committees, but one or more students as well.
Consequently, the Wellman Report not only called for faculty and students to
serve on presidential search committees, but also for them to be recommended by
their respective governance bodies. While this new policy diffused for the moment
the tensions that had been building since the creation of the new system, it did not
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fundamentally alter the distribution of power. 7 The trustees retained their right to
govern the university.
When Bob Wood was ready to step down from office in 1977, the trustees decided
to replace him with Franklin Patterson, whom they named as interim president. Pat-
terson, who was chosen without any faculty consultation or participation, assumed a
modest caretaker role. The same method was followed in 1990, when Joseph Duffey
was chosen for the presidency. Trustee failure to consult faculty had become a recur-
ring pattern. The one major exception was in 1978, when David Knapp was selected
as president, the first time ever that faculty and students participated in a trustee
search committee. The trustees scrupulously adhered to the Wellman Report and the
governance principles of "joint effort" and "primary responsibility," but the Knapp
search was marred by lack of confidentiality and by a violation of the state's "sun-
shine" or open-meeting law.
The same mistakes were repeated in 1991, when E. K. Fretwell was appointed
president. In a state known for its political interference in public higher education,
this last search became highly politicized and divisive. These searches provide
chronological continuity to the story. Taken together, they left a legacy of mutual
distrust between faculty and trustees that still lingers. 8 Unless one understands the
tensions surrounding them, one cannot fully comprehend the tensions and conflict
that surrounded the Hooker search.
There was also the problem of a "revolving door" presidency. The rapid turnover
of three presidents within five years, along with the exit of numerous administrators
and teachers, was alarming in terms of institutional stability. Adversely affected by
the drastic budget cuts in recent years, the power and prestige of the president's
office had suffered accordingly. In the late 1980s, Governor Michael Dukakis at-
tempted to abolish the office. With a powerful state board of regents in place at the
time, he saw the UMass president's office as an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy.
But he did not succeed. Instead, the state board of regents was abolished by the legis-
lature in 1991 and has since been replaced by a new agency known as the Higher
Education Coordinating Council. There was also a lingering feeling that the expected
leadership role in the president's office was not being filled. All of this gave the up-
coming search a sense of heightened urgency.
Devising a Search Strategy
In this onerous setting, the trustees were more than eager to find a new leader who
could assert the authority of the office and revitalize the public university. They
wanted someone who would be able to restore faculty morale and public confidence.
Unsure of the political terrain and what lay ahead, the trustees were somewhat skit-
tish about how to conduct a search that would avoid the blunders of yore. They had
ample grounds for concern: no matter what they did, they were bound to be
criticized. To quote McLaughlin and Riesman again:
Questions concerning how the search committee will be constituted, which con-
stituents should be represented with membership on the search committee, and
how these representatives should be determined often embroil a campus in con-
troversy at the very outset of the search process. Similarly, the question of con-
fidentiality versus publicity is often one of the most controversial issues.
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Against this background, board chairman Gordon Oakes asked trustee Daniel
Taylor to chair the search committee. In naming Taylor, Oakes got as a bonus the
benefit of a strong-minded individual with legal and political experience. 10 A Boston
attorney associated with the prestigious law firm of Hill and Barlow, Taylor was
talented and well suited for the assignment. Prior to his appointment as a trustee, he
had served as legal counsel to Governor Michael Dukakis, and from 1982 to 1986 he
had chaired the state Judicial Nomination Commission, which gave him valuable ex-
perience in screening and selecting judges. From 1990 to 1991, Taylor had served on
the state board of regents. His professional life provided sufficient flexibility so that
he could devote the requisite time to a search. He began by reading everything he
could find on the subject.
Reading and experience alike had taught Taylor that the trustees would have to
conduct a different kind of search this time. He understood that it was no longer
feasible for them to act unilaterally. As an attorney, he likewise understood that they
were legally required to conduct a national search which complied with affirmative
action guidelines and the state's open-meeting law. Both Taylor and Fretwell paid a
special visit to David Riesman and Judith McLaughlin at Harvard University. These
two experts in presidential searches discussed with Taylor and Fretwell the requisite
procedures and ground rules for planning and executing a sound search.
Though Taylor wanted to find a dynamic leader, his judgment on what to do was
disciplined by awareness of what had gone before and might happen again, and also
by the potentials of the present. He knew firsthand how politicized the Fretwell
search had been the previous year. His worst fear was that they might wind up with a
"dull administrative bureaucrat" — a result, he felt, that would condemn the univer-
sity to mediocrity. While he earnestly believed that the kind of motivated leader they
were seeking was out there somewhere, he initially had some doubts about whether
they would be able to attract such a person. 11 Acting on what he knew in terms of in-
stitutional history, he set the stage for that new direction. He was to push hard for a
systemwide approach that would involve the five campuses acting as a unified entity.
On that score he remained steadfast.
With these thoughts in mind, Taylor sat down with Gordon Oakes, and they put
together a diverse and well-balanced search committee in terms of ethnic, racial, and
gender composition. They were meticulous in naming people whose stature and
presence added credibility in useful quarters, and they also appointed to the commit-
tee several trustees who represented both the old and the new campuses. All told, the
search committee was comprised of seven trustees, three faculty members, several
prominent civic, labor, and business leaders, alumni of the university, and four sitting
presidents of other higher education institutions. Interim president E. K. Fretwell
served as an ex officio, nonvoting member.
At the request of board chairman Gordon Oakes, Governor William Weld invited
Neil Rudenstine, president of Harvard University, and Terrence Murray, president of
Fleet Bank, the largest bank in New England, to join the group. Intrigued by the in-
vitation, both men agreed to serve. The three other sitting presidents were Stanley
Ikenberry of the University of Illinois, Elizabeth Kennan of Mount Holyoke College,
and Katherine Sloan of Greenfield Community College.
In addition to Dan Taylor, the trustees included Joseph Finnerty of New Bedford,
Michael Foley of Arlington, Peter Lewenberg of Waban, James O'Leary of Boston,
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Alan Solomont of North Andover, and student trustee Thomas Winston of Lowell.
The three faculty members were Ronald Story from Amherst, Miren Uriarte from
Boston, and John Russell from Dartmouth. They were arbitrarily handpicked by
Taylor and Oakes, not by their respective faculty colleagues. Along with a few
others, former NBA basketball star Julius Erving and businessman Lawrence
McKenna represented the alumni. Rounding out the group were James Bailey, a
member of the state Higher Education Coordinating Council, Hugina McNally, a
labor union official, Benaree Wiley, president of a minority community organization,
and Bing Lou Wong, a business executive. The search committee's twenty-two
members represented the right political mix, but some faculty considered it a public
relations gimmick.
No sooner had the membership of the search committee been announced than
trouble started. Rumblings of discord were heard concerning the composition of the
committee and the manner in which it had been chosen. Campus chancellors were
upset because they were denied representation, and students felt that they were
seriously underrepresented. Faculty at both the Boston and Lowell campuses were
likewise upset because they had not been consulted. The faculty at Lowell contended
that trustee failure to consult them amounted to a breach of their contract. At Boston
they argued that the trustee action violated provisions of their Faculty Council con-
stitution. In their view, the constitution was a two-party document that could not be
abrogated without the consent of the other party.
More serious and worrisome, the faculty complained that the three professors who
had been chosen to represent them had not been recommended by their respective
faculty governance bodies as was specified in the Wellman Report. Such protests
made little headway. Professor Charles Knight, who chaired the Faculty Council at
Boston, wrote a forceful letter to Taylor, explaining that the faculty regarded them-
selves as entitled to have a voice in the selection of the next president. The trustee
decisions were briefly contested in an exchange of letters, but to no avail. As Knight
later explained, "It would have been just too disruptive to file litigation at this
point." 12 Professor Paul Tucker, who served as faculty representative to the board of
trustees from the Boston campus, was of the same opinion. He believed that it would
have been too damaging to the search process. Nevertheless, Tucker argued that the
trustee action amounted to "an abrogation of faculty primary responsibility." 13
Since Taylor was a lawyer, that problem fell initially to him. Taking a firm stand,
he refused to be budged. Not long in coming, though, was the answer to the question.
By the time the faculty had exchanged correspondence with Taylor, the point was
moot. The trustees' charge to the search committee directing it to recommend three
candidates to the board for selection was approved by the trustees on December 4,
1991. In drafting the motion to approve the charge, Taylor carefully worded it to
read, "It is hereby voted, notwithstanding any other policy or procedure to the con-
trary." 14 It was a subtle power play. By playing this card, Taylor had finessed the
faculty, who were angry. They regarded Taylor's move as deliberately provocative in
nature. But the faculty was too demoralized to protect their legitimate interests.
By a stroke of a pen, the trustees had wiped the slate clean by short-circuiting the
Wellman Report. They purposely did not want to appoint a student and faculty mem-
ber from each campus. Strategically, their intent here was to foster a sense of "sys-
tem awareness" and to sharpen sensitivity toward the idea that decisions should be
17
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made in the interests of the university as a whole. They were concerned that compet-
ing forces from rival campuses might use their influence as potential veto groups,
and that this set of circumstances might conceivably lead to stalemate or possible
separatism and division. The trustees also wanted to maintain control of the search
and to reassert their appointing authority. Above all, they were determined to find a
new president without getting bogged down in what they deemed as time-consuming
and counterproductive entanglements over process.
E. K. Fretwell's contribution was crucial. When he was appointed president he had
agreed not to become a candidate for the permanent position. His pledge sent a mes-
sage to the outside world that the search was on the level, or at least that it was not
rigged for an insider. Fretwell also agreed to help the trustees find a permanent presi-
dent with whom they could feel comfortable. Moreover, he suggested that the search
committe seek its own independent space in which to operate.
Following his advice, they obtained an office at One International Place in
downtown Boston, which was physically removed from any campus and from the
university's central office. This had symbolic importance, reinforcing the impression
that the search committee was running its own show. The downtown location gave
them a place where committee records could be kept under tight security. In all,
Fretwell's counsel made their job a lot easier. The search committee hired Stephen
Kulik, who had worked as a consultant to former president Joseph Duffey at the
Amherst campus, as executive director to coordinate its activities. All their meetings
were posted and held in accordance with the requirements of the Massachusetts open-
meeting law.
Another participant who contributed significantly was Ronald Story. A professor
of history at Amherst, he was secretary of its Faculty Senate and director of the
University Fund for the Future. Prior to the search, Story had written a paper entitled
"Our Present Ordeal: A Historical Note," which he presented to an alumni leadership
conference on June 16, 1991. In his paper he traced four distinct cycles of university
growth and looked at the present issue with a sense of both the past and the future. 15
At least in some general way, he brought to bear an understanding of how UMass
had evolved as an institution of higher learning and how it had arrived at its current
predicament in 1991. That understanding contributed immensely to the committee's
deliberations.
Afterward, Taylor referred to Story as "the intellectual godfather of the search."
Both men came from public land-grant universities, and both had done graduate work
at similar institutions. Taylor had attended the University of Illinois, Story the Univer-
sity of Texas. Close friends, they frequently went on fishing trips together. More im-
portant, both men shared a dream of building a first-class university comparable to
the great public universities of the Midwest. 16
For his part, Story moved expeditiously to help straighten things out with regard
to the thorny issue of faculty consultation. On January 7, 1992, an informal coordinat-
ing group composed of faculty governance officials from the five campuses met at
the Publick House in Sturbridge. This group, which was organized at Story's sugges-
tion, was formed partly to facilitate informal faculty involvement in the search and
partly to smooth ruffled feathers over the divisive issue of consultation. Fretwell and
Taylor were invited to attend. The main agenda item was the presidential search. This
meeting gave those in attendance a chance to sound off and to express their concerns.
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Before the group adjourned, they agreed to meet at least once a month while the
search was going on, an agreement they kept.
It should be noted that the five campus faculty representatives, who served as
liaison to the board of trustees, were also part of this group. They interacted with the
trustees and shared information with their faculty colleagues. This sort of linkage and
communication was important, because it enhanced the process by making it more in-
clusive. Yet participants like Paul Tucker sensed that faculty were going to be
avoided as much as possible.
Launching the Search
A few wseks later, on January 21, the search committee held its first meeting. Piedad
Robertson, secretary of education, who brought greetings from Governor William
Weld, spoke about the importance of the presidency and higher education's need for
accountability. Dan Taylor proposed a schedule for carrying out the search and indi-
cated his desire to conclude it by the June 3 meeting of the board of trustees. He then
outlined three tasks that needed to be done and asked for volunteers to work on them.
These tasks involved (1) developing a case statement; (2) establishing a compensation
package; and (3) selecting a search firm. 17
Given his prior experience in selecting state judges, Taylor put a high premium on
confidentiality. He knew what could go wrong and was afraid that attractive can-
didates might be scared off if their names were disclosed prematurely. Similarly, he
feared that intrusive news media might dismantle the search process if there were
leaks. Several trustees on the search committee believed that strict confidentiality
should be maintained until the full board had made its selection. In other words, they
felt that no one, except the members of the search committee and the board, should
ever know the identity of any candidate other than the new president. They honored
this commitment.
A lengthy discussion then followed on the kind of leadership they desired. The
search committee agreed to disagree about specific candidates, especially at this early
stage of the search. Their discussions were far-ranging but centered on the question
of whether the university faced a long-term or short-term managerial problem. Im-
provement depended on personalities and circumstances. On the one hand, they felt
that if it was a short-term problem, it required bringing in someone who would make
tough managerial decisions, even at the risk of alienating the academic community.
On the other hand, if the problem was a long-term one, the dynamic changed ap-
preciably. Under these conditions, they felt that a new president could not win the
long-term battle without genuine support from the faculty at large. They pretty much
decided that their dilemma fell into the latter category. "The tenor of this discussion
was the single most important determinant of the search," Ron Story later said, trying
to evoke the feeling in the room. 18
The next step was to select the search consultants. After soliciting proposals from
ten recognized executive search firms, the subcommittee interviewed three and chose
Academic Search Consultation Service (ASCS), a nonprofit firm based in Washing-
ton, D.C. This firm, run by Ronald Stead and Allan Ostar, had a good track record in
working with public universities. Stead himself was a graduate of Michigan State
University. Trustee Michael Foley checked them out thoroughly. In his words, "They
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not only understood the cost factor and were reasonably priced, but they also were
not in it to rip us off." 19 Stanley Ikenberry, president of the University of Illinois,
was very helpful in selecting the consultants.
As things developed, it became clear that Stead and Ostar knew their business.
They had previously been involved in some 127 searches in higher education. They
operated with the utmost integrity and extended the reach of the search committee. A
trust relationship soon developed between them. Meanwhile, Stead for his part came
to realize that the search was on the level, especially when he heard an unidentified
trustee jokingly remark, "This search is wired to be nonpolitical."20 Since ASCS even-
tually discovered Michael Hooker, they were well worth their price.
Formulating the Announcement
The early stages of the search proceeded routinely. Through February and into
March, Dan Taylor met personally with each of the five chancellors, their senior
staff, and in some instances, academic deans and student leaders as well as with key
central office staff. The views of several prominent educators outside the university
were also sought. At the same time, the search consultants undertook a similar series
of meetings to develop their own views of the university's leadership needs. They
shared their findings with the trustees in a detailed memorandum. While this
memorandum mentioned the various pitfalls and priorities of the search, it also urged
the trustees to provide the budget necessary to run the president's office before the
new president was appointed. If this was not done, the next executive would be
blamed for the inevitable need to increase the resources to operate the office. 21 That
was wise, considering what Taylor ultimately set out to achieve.
These meetings, aided by discussions within the search committee, produced a
draft "Announcement" that defined the objectives of the search and made the case
for why a motivated leader should want to seek the UMass presidency. Ron Story
wrote the initial draft of the document, which was then widely circulated on the five
campuses. It served as the basis of discussion at public hearings, which were held on
each campus in early March. Those who spoke at these hearings commented on the
qualities that they would like to see in the new president. Taylor had to keep his case
focused on this issue distinct from and unimpaired by the hostility he himself might
arouse while doing such work.
Taylor himself was highly involved in this second phase of the search. He talked
frankly with the various constituencies on campus, in terms befitting their status, ap-
pealing more to logic than to parochial campus views, offering the outline of a
lawyer's brief and asking them to help him fill it in. Taylor avowedly sought to start
a dialogue and offer a process that allowed for appropriate input. He gave them a
chance to air their complaints and welcomed their feedback. Faculty members were
worried that the trustees might prefer a nonacademic person, perhaps someone from
the business community or the political world.
After the public hearings, Taylor revised the case statement and integrated the cam-
pus feedback into it. The document no doubt benefited from such contributions. It
described the presidential job opening as providing a challenging opportunity for
someone "to leave his or her indelible mark on this unshaped system." This incen-
tive had a powerful appeal. As Taylor put it: "Through the power of words, we
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encouraged people out there to take a shot at us. We didn't complain about the
budget cuts, and we didn't promise them a bed of roses."22
Despite its length, the document made very clear that the committee was seeking a
person who could lead, not simply manage. More precisely, they wanted someone
who possessed four basic qualities: (1) a leader of public stature; (2) a creator of
vision; (3) an institution builder; and (4) an individual of personal and intellectual in-
tegrity. Under each of these categories they listed numerous other criteria.23 In sum,
they wanted a high-energy "evangelical" leader who would hit the road and take the
message of the university to the far corners of the state. The job profile left no doubt
as to the kind of visionary person they had in mind, and everyone benefited from this
clarity.
But as ever in Massachusetts, it was the person in power that mattered most, so
the focus of attention swiftly shifted to the new governor, William Weld, who came
from a priviliged Yankee Brahmin social background. Harvard-educated and a
patrician by disposition, Weld was fast becoming a convert with regard to the impor-
tance of public higher education to the state's economy. Not long in office and still
popular, he had changed his position dramatically from the previous year, when he
had threatened to close some public colleges and impose harsh budget cuts. Speaking
to a conference of environmentalists and civic leaders at UMass/Boston on March 6,
Weld declared:
The more I see of our system of public higher education in Massachusetts, the bet-
ter I like it. I do not think that everything that works in education costs money,
and not everything that costs money works. However, I've said before, and I'll
say it again, that when we get a little bit of daylight and the fiscal crunch eases
up a little bit in Massachusetts, higher education will be standing, if not first in
line, at least tied for first place with the claimants on our public resources. -4
To be sure, Weld's conversion along these lines was an important development, be-
cause his support would later bolster the search at a crucial stage.
The Compensation Package
Meanwhile, in late March, a subcommittee composed of trustees Finnerty, Lewen-
berg, O'Leary, and Taylor, plus James Bailey of the Higher Education Coordinating
Council, began working on an executive compensation report to establish salary
guidelines for the UMass presidency. The salary issue, which had been troublesome
in years past, had not been reviewed or revisited since the merger in 1991. It was of
crucial importance to the overall scheme of things. According to them:
The last thing we need, as one of our Chancellors put it, is someone who gets a
lot of balls up in the air and then leaves after 3 or 4 years because he or she
knows they can't catch them. Clearly, building the kind of top-ranked public
university system that the Trustees desire will take a solid, ten-year effort by the
new President. The Trustees should not expect the job to be finished, or for the
end to be in sight in ten years. But with the right leader, ten years is. perhaps,
time to reach the end of the beginning.25
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The goal here was to recommend guidelines that would enable the trustees to offer
a competitive salary and fringe benefits that would compare favorably with those at
similar public universities across the country. What is more, they wanted to be able
to accomplish this goal before the search committee began considering candidates.
By so doing, they could avoid the possible embarrassment at the end of the search
of the impression that they were haggling over salary, or that the person they had
picked was holding out for more money. As they said:
Principles of equity and fairness are served in the short term by doing this now.
And long-term harmony is also fostered if the new President, on the one hand,
doesn't come with the idea that the Trustees are cheap and will have to be reedu-
cated along the way, and the Trustees, on the other hand, don't feel that they were
taken to the cleaners.
Since the compensation question was such a sensitive issue politically, they did
not want to saddle the new president with the political liability of a package being
designed specifically for him or her.
Other public university systems were surveyed to determine the salary of their
chief executive officers, and published data was researched. The UMass subcommit-
tee recommended a basic salary of $150,000 to $175,000. By comparison, former
president Joseph Duffey had been paid $130,000, plus a $30,000 annuity payable at
his retirement. Among other fringe benefits, the subcommittee recommended that the
housing allowance be somewhere between $19,000 and $30,000, and if necessary, a
noninterest-bearing second mortgage loan of up to $200,000 be made available, this
to be repaid when the president's house was sold. The subcommittee made its recom-
mendations to the full search committee, which in turn endorsed and forwarded the
report through its chair to the board of trustees in early April. These recommenda-
tions received active endorsement by the trustees. From then on, the salary issue
would be negotiated with the person who was finally selected as president.
Casting the Net
On March 15, the "Announcement," along with a cover letter from Dan Taylor, was
mailed to more than nine hundred knowledgeable people, asking them for sugges-
tions and assistance in developing a pool of prospects. As is true in most presidential
searches, advertisements were placed in publications such as The Chronicle of
Higher Education and Black Issues in Higher Education. No specific application
deadline was mentioned. On this point, Taylor created some breathing room by
saying that the search committee planned to present its report to the board of trustees
by the summer of 1992. The troubles at UMass had been widely publicized, and
some feared that it would be difficult to attract good candidates.27
Once the net was fully cast, names of prospects came to the search committee
from four different sources. First, seventeen applications were received in response to
the advertisements. Second, in response to the March Announcement mailing, fifty-
three names were suggested as possibilities. Third, members of the search committee
suggested forty names. Fourth, the search consultants developed a list of thirty-nine
prospects. 28
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At its April 6 meeting, the search committee began to focus on potential
prospects. Names like U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and former U.S.
Senator Paul Tsongas surfaced. Although Tsongas had chaired the state board of
regents, it was felt that he carried too much political baggage. Nobody wanted to see
a repetition of the clamorous public spectacle that took place in 1991, when former
Massachusetts House Speaker David Bartley sought the position and the search be-
came highly politicized. These past mistakes were to be avoided as much as possible.
At one point in the meeting, trustee Michael Foley, a medical doctor, suggested that
in order to be sure they were getting the best pool of applicants possible, they should
think of three people in their own fields of endeavor. He then went out and brought
back the names of three prospects in the field of medicine. By this time, however,
most of the participants were looking for an academic rather than a politician or a
business executive. Although they did not formally rule out the category, there was
general agreement that they would consider only an extraordinary nonacademic as a
strong contender. 29
Several duplicate names surfaced on the four lists. The search committee reviewed
them and decided to focus its attention on a limited number. Most of the people were
then contacted by the search consultants to determine their level of interest, if any, in
the presidency. During this third phase of the search, the focus was on twenty-seven
prospects from throughout the country. In comparison with previous searches, it was
a shallow pool of prospects. Of these, nine were women, and eight were African-
Americans. Several were chief executives of campuses within public university sys-
tems. A few were high-level system executives. Some were deans of colleges at
public universities. Still others had distinguished themselves in academic life and
public affairs. Soon after this screening, the search committee decided that they
would not pursue anyone at the dean level or below. They were warned that their
focus on "prospects" did not necessarily imply any reciprocal interest, and in many
instances that proved to be the case. All in all, a number of well-qualified individuals
expressed preliminary interest.
The name of Michael Hooker, who was then president of the University of
Maryland, Baltimore County, first appeared on the consultants' — Ronald Stead and
Allan Ostar's — list. A gifted scholar and highly respected administrator generally
recognized as having a talent for leadership, Hooker seemed to them to be an attrac-
tive candidate. He also had a reputation for taking risks. By temperament, he was a
builder and an innovator. A check of his curriculum vitae revealed his record of
scholarly publications — he had edited two books and published eighteen articles in
his academic discipline of philosophy. 30 Stead knew of his availability and contacted
Hooker to determine if he might be interested in the job. At first pass. Hooker turned
Stead down, mainly because he did not believe that the Massachusetts economy
would rebound quickly enough. Under such circumstances, he saw himself having to
implement more budget cuts for the next five years. Since Hooker was more inter-
ested in building an institution than in downsizing it, he saw no point in pursuing the
UMass presidency any further.
But this did not stop Taylor and the search committee from courting him. Sensing
from the start that Hooker might be a prize catch, someone who might more than
meet the search committee's criteria, they persisted in their efforts and managed to
convince him that the situation in Massachusetts was promising despite the state's
sluggish economy. Actively countering all his doubts, they persuaded Hooker to
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apply for the university presidency. At the time, he was under serious consideration
for the presidency of the College of William and Mary in Virginia, but owing to com-
plications in his private life, he was undecided about his next career move.
Meantime, in mid-to-late April, those prospects who expressed interest in the
UMass presidency were invited to meet informally with a small group of search
committee members. These exploratory sessions were designed to determine whether
the committee wanted to encourage further involvement, and conversely, whether the
individual wished to pursue his or her preliminary attraction. At the May 6 meeting
of the search committee, Taylor announced that with regard to their affirmative ac-
tion efforts, serious contacts had been made, but noted that there was no further inter-
est expressed on the part of those identified. Because of the severe funding problem
and the perceived negative racial climate in Boston, several good minority candidates
who met the affirmative action profile either withdrew or refrained from pursuing
their candidacy. 31 Nevertheless, some critics felt that the search committee should
have pursued the minority candidates as vigorously as they pursued Hooker.
By the end of the May 6 meeting, the search committee decided which prospects
they desired to invite back for another meeting. They had narrowed their short list to
four candidates, none Hispanic or African-American, and only one female. 32 At this
point, Taylor went back to the board of trustees and asked them to change their
charge to the search committee to allow it to recommend four candidates instead of
three as originally specified. The trustees agreed to do so. With four "good fish" in
the net, Taylor saw no point in delaying the process any further. Rather than let the
process drag out until early summer and run the risk of losing their catch, he ac-
celerated the schedule by two weeks and moved up the next meeting of the search
committee to May 12.
Landing Michael Hooker
On May 12 the search committee met with the four finalists, all of whom had com-
pleted legal forms asserting their privacy rights. They were assured that their names
and comments would be kept in strictest confidence. As a precautionary measure,
Taylor had lined up in advance sufficient votes to go into executive session to
achieve this objective. He was even willing to risk a lawsuit should it prove neces-
sary. As a lawyer, he felt that case law would support their position, but no one chal-
lenged them on the issue. Consequently, the privacy of the candidates was well
preserved and their identities remained a closely guarded secret.
The search committee then split into two groups for interview purposes, making
sure that none of the candidates saw one another. During the course of these inter-
views, both groups asked each candidate the same set of questions:
Based on your current understanding, what interests you the most in this position
and what are your reservations? What would be your priorities for the first six
months of your administration? What is the most difficult decision you've had to
make recently? What have been your successes in regard to addressing the needs
of minorities on campus? What would your message be to the opinion leaders of
the state and the campuses with regard to improving race relations and the educa-
tion of minority students?33
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Of the four finalists, Michael Hooker quickly emerged as the leading contender.
He was an ambitious as well as an able man. More than that, in the view of the
search committee, he had impressive credentials and a record of administrative
achievement in both the private and public sectors of higher education. Hooker had
earned his B.A. degree with highest honors in 1969 at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he majored in philosophy. Continuing to do graduate
work in the same field, he went on to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
where he received his M.A. in 1972 and his Ph.D. in 1973. To the extent that there is
a customary career line to a university presidency, Hooker had pursued it. From a
faculty position at Harvard University, he moved to Johns Hopkins University,
where, from 1975 to 1982, he held a variety of posts. He first served as assistant
professor of philosophy, then as assistant dean and associate dean, and finally, at the
age of thirty-five, as dean of undergraduate and graduate studies.
From 1982 to 1986 Hooker served as president of Bennington College in Vermont,
where he first achieved public notice as a skilled fiscal manager. In retrospect, he
admits that as a "rookie president" he did not know the right questions to ask
beforehand. On his first day in office, he was informed that there was not enough
money to meet the payroll at the end of the month. To make matters worse, he in-
herited a weak and unprofessional administrative apparatus. In short order, Hooker
oversaw a refinancing of Bennington's debt, using long-term tax-exempt bonds that
included a provision for repayment. In addition, he demonstrated an ability to raise a
substantial amount of money, in fact raising more than $6 million and increasing
total gift support by 80 percent. He also streamlined the college's marketing strategy,
professionalized its administrative staff, and strengthened its board of trustees. Com-
mitted to holding the line on spending, Hooker made some tough decisisons that
enabled the college to survive its fiscal crisis. The evidence of his accomplishments
is documented in a detailed case study written by a faculty member at the Yale
School of Management. 34
After this success, Hooker accepted the presidency at the University of Maryland,
Baltimore County (UMBC), in 1986, where he continued to make a name for him-
self. To the surprise of no one who knew him, he brought about change in two
specific areas: improving academic quality and increasing access, especially for
minority students. During his six years there, which extended from 1986 to 1992, he
boosted enrollment by 20 percent at the undergraduate level and 150 percent in
graduate programs. Student retention also improved, with the number of bachelor's
degrees granted increasing by 53 percent.
Hooker took fresh initiatives on a variety of fronts. He established an honors
college and launched the much-publicized Meyerhoff Scholarship Program for black
students who were gifted in science and technology. He also built strong links with
Maryland's business community. He initiated new academic programs in biotech-
nology, biochemical engineering, and bioprocess manufacturing, and with the help of
business corporations like Westinghouse and Martin Marietta, he began new
specializations in photonics and robotics. Furthermore, he developed a working
model of collaboration between UMBC and Catonsville Community College. 33
On another front, Hooker had been working on a proposed merger between
UMBC and the medical school in downtown Baltimore. In order to achieve the polit-
ical support necessary to get the enabling legislation passed in the Maryland legisla-
ture, he had to build an alliance between the rival city and county legislative
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delegations, which traditionally had been at odds with each other. While engaged in
this endeavor, he suddenly realized that there was one remaining obstacle in the way,
namely, himself. Perceived as an empire builder by medical faculty who saw their
budget threatened, Hooker sensed that things would go much better if he bowed out
gracefully. Such a move was, of course, extremely good politics. As soon as he
declared that he would not be a candidate for the head of the merged institution, the
legislative proposal gained momentum.
Amid speculation about Hooker's altruistic motives, the bill was approved by the
governor, the board of regents, the commissioner of education, and the House of Rep-
resentatives, but it was killed in committee in the state Senate. At this point, Hooker
decided that he had done all that he could possibly do at UMBC and that it was time
for him to move on.
For these reasons, Hooker impressed the search committee and the other trustees
who were invited to sit in on the interviews. His point of view was fresh, eager, and
confident. He conveyed his belief that with political will and courage the future was
manageable. In laying out his vision of the future university, Hooker provided them
with persuasive and imaginative ideas. He seemed in full command of every question
and absolutely confident about his ability to build a diverse and interactive public
university that would meet the societal demands of the twenty-first century. His per-
formance, from all accounts, was impressive.
Hooker came across in the interviews as an ideal person to fill the role of presi-
dent and fit committee criteria better than the other three candidates. According to
Professor Miren Uriarte, "Hooker had presented the most coherent vision of the role
of public higher education in this state, both in terms of access to minorities, and in
terms of cost."36 Hooker's major shortcoming was that he lacked experience in run-
ning a university system. More a visionary than a manager of details, he was not
likely to micromanage at the campus level. Actually, he had operated under such a
situation at UMBC, and he understood what it was like to operate in the shadow of a
"flagship campus."
At forty-six years of age, Hooker saw the UMass opportunity as the next logical
step in his career ladder. On this point, he felt confident that he could do a good job
as a system head. That was one reason why the UMass presidency appealed to him.
It was a relatively new system, at least as far as the addition of the Dartmouth and
Lowell campuses was concerned. The other reasons for job appeal were that Hooker
was a UMass alumnus who loved the game of politics and wanted to come back to
Massachusetts. 37 The four years he had spent at UMass/Amherst during the early
1970s would stand him in good stead.
Hooker was such a striking personality that committee members could not help
looking at the other colorful aspects of his life. He was born in Richlands, Virginia,
on August 24, 1945, the only son of a coal miner. Soon after his birth, the family
moved to the heart of Appalachia in West Virginia near the Kentucky border, where
they lived in the midst of abject poverty. At the school young Hooker attended, most
of the boys in his class chewed tobacco and wore no shoes. Many of the people
living in this rural mountainous region suffered from stark deprivation that resulted
from disease, poverty, and malnutrition. Growing up in a coal-mining town, Hooker
came to understand the problems of working people and why they needed labor
unions to protect them. His whole outlook on life was to be deepened by this
sobering experience.
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To see how Hooker's life as a coal miner's son shaped his values, one more in-
sight must be added to the composite of his makeup. From early childhood, his
parents had told him repeatedly that he was the smartest kid around. They stressed
the importance of education. In fact, they consciously decided to have only one child
because they wanted him to obtain a college education in order to make it out of the
coal mines. In his high school years they drove him around during summer vacations
to see college campuses in the South, but they were too ashamed of their poverty to
get out of their automobile. Hooker believed deeply in what he was first taught. As
he recalls, "My father had desperately wanted to go to college, but he had to work in
the mines in order to take care of his father, who suffered from black lung disease.
He taught me two things — nobody is better than you, and you are better than
nobody."38 This became a defining moment for him. As a result of these childhood
experiences, Hooker grew up acquiring humility on the one hand and self-confidence
on the other. This dichotomy explains a great deal about his personal style and mode
of operation.
Coming from such humble origins and achieving such success, Hooker struck a
responsive chord with the search committee. They saw him as someone who not only
understood and appreciated the value of public higher education, but also as someone
who could take it to a higher level of quality, diversity, and access. The trustees felt
that Hooker's intimate knowledge of UMass/Amherst, obtained while he was a
graduate student there, would enable him to hit the ground running. They liked the
idea that he had both public and private sector experience. They also liked the idea
that he had headed an urban campus similar to UMass/Boston and that he had
worked closely with a medical center similar to UMass/Worcester. In fact, the
similarities between UMBC and UMass/Boston were striking. Most of all, they liked
the track record that he had established in terms of promoting good race relations. 39
This had direct revelance to UMass/Amherst, where racial tensions had reached an
all-time high in recent years. Hooker also had established a good rapport with the
clerical and professional staff at UMBC. All this seemed clear enough to the trustees.
They were definitely not interested in anyone who was nearing the end of his or her
career. Hooker, at forty-six, was still in his prime. As was becoming rapidly apparent,
he seemed fully qualified for the job.
At the conclusion of the May 12 interviews, the members of the search comittee
had reduced their options to three prospects. Ranking them, they unanimously recom-
mended Hooker as their first choice. They admired his abilities and understood his
limitations. Their comparisons of him with the other three candidates sharpened their
consensus for selectivity. So it was settled. Hooker was the person they wanted for
the job. Thus, his was the only name they forwarded to the full board of trustees. All
three faculty members on the search committee concurred with this decision. The stu-
dent trustee, Thomas Winston of UMass/Lowell, was noticeably absent from this
meeting.
Obscured from public view by the shroud of secrecy that concealed their iden-
tities, the other three prospects remain a mystery to the outside world, including the
academic community. As a consequence, they quickly faded into complete
anonymity. The accounts that come down to us reveal only the vaguest kind of iden-
tifying characteristics. All of them were professional academic administrators, and all
of them headed an institution of higher learning. None came from New England. One
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was a female, another was near the end of his career. Based on what they heard in
the interviews, the search committee decided not to recommend the fourth candidate.
An Abbreviated Courtship
Because the search was moving so rapidly at this point, the courtship of Michael
Hooker was fast and furious. It was not a prolonged romance. As Hooker himself
explained, "The committee saw very quickly that I was exactly what they were look-
ing for, and they were able to convince me reasonably quickly that this opportunity
afforded what I was looking for. So I would say that it was a fairly short courtship,
because we each knew a great deal about the other before the courtship began."40
As the talks continued, Hooker assured the trustees that he planned to stay at UMass
for the next ten years, a commitment all participants felt was essential for the next
president.
Nevertheless, Hooker would not commit himself one way or the other until after
he had a chance to speak with the key political leaders in Massachusetts. He wanted
to take some soundings from them to see where they stood on public higher educa-
tion. No longer a neophyte president, he knew the "right questions" to ask this time.
Arrangements were made for him to meet with Governor William Weld, a Republi-
can, and Senate president William Bulger and House Speaker Charles Flaherty, both
Democrats. He also met with Piedad Robertson, the secretary of education, and Paul
Marks, the chancellor of higher education. These preappointment meetings went well.
Hooker came away from them feeling that he could garner the necessary political sup-
port to build the twenty-first-century university that he had in mind. With such as-
surances, he agreed to accept the job for a five-year term. Behind the scenes, the
trustees earlier that spring had received strong signals from the governor's office and
from the legislative leadership that they could expect a favorable budget if they made
a good selection.41
Another cause of concern, from Taylor's standpoint, was how to introduce Hooker
to the chancellors and faculty leaders without blowing his cover. Worried about pos-
sible leaks if the work of the search committee were conducted on campus, the
lawyer-trustee who chaired the search committee had ruled out the possibility of cam-
pus visits by the candidates. Not everyone was happy with this development. It
meant that the five chancellors and their respective constituencies had yet to meet
Hooker. They were peeved, not without justification, because they had not been al-
lowed to interview him before the search committee had made its recommendations
to the board of trustees.42
Understandably, the chancellors as a group felt that they had been completely
bypassed. They saw this intentional omission and the disallowance of campus visits
as a "double failure" in process. It not only meant that the five campuses had no
chance to get to know the candidates, but the candidates in turn had no chance to
respond to campus concerns. The problem was partially resolved, but it did not hap-
pen until twenty-four hours before the full board of trustees voted.
On May 26, the chancellors, along with the informal group of faculty governance
officials, finally got to meet Hooker at the central office in Boston. When Taylor in-
troduced him to the assembled group, he reportedly remarked, "We are still operating
in our stealth mode."43 Both the chancellors and the faculty members felt that this
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was secrecy carried to extremes. Such treatment rankled them and reinforced the ear-
lier impression that they were to be avoided as much as possible. As they saw it, the
decision had already been made and the vote of the board, which was scheduled for
the next day, was a mere formality.
While Hooker was making the rounds at the State House on May 26, he did not
pass unnoticed. Word of his being the unanimous choice of the search committee was
leaked to the press. Anthony Flint, writing in the Boston Globe, broke the story the
next day.44 When it appeared, Taylor was upset with the leak. Prior to the appearance
of the news story, all aspects of the search had been kept confidential. Now all that
was gone in an instant. Since the news story came out the very day that the trustees
voted, it did not seriously hurt Hooker's position.
Meanwhile, Taylor had been busy checking out Hooker with his former employers
and other leading educators. Following standard operating procedure for such high-
level appointments in state government, the state police conducted its own separate
background investigation. On May 20, both trustee Joseph Finnerty and faculty mem-
ber Ronald Story flew to Baltimore to check out Hooker on their own and to talk
with others at UMBC about him as a potential president for UMass.
As Finnerty later explained, "The trip provided us with a chance to go down and
kick the tires of the automobile that we were going to buy."45 He spoke with a
variety of people, including UMBC provost Adam Yarmolinsky; Errol Reese, presi-
dent of the medical school; Theodore Peck, a housing expert; Thomas Chmura, a
member of the Greater Baltimore Committee; and Barbara Plantholt, a graduate of
the MIT Sloan School of Management, all of whom had nice things to say about
Hooker. For example, Plantholt candidly told Finnerty, "Grab him. This guy can sit
down at the table with the presidents of Harvard and MIT, and you will know that he
belongs at the table."46
The responses Story solicited were much the same. He talked with three faculty
members, two campus academic administrators, one central office administrator, and
one minority student. Freeman Hrabowski, a black professional administrator at
UMBC, told Story that "Hooker had turned the institution around on a dime."
Hrabowski was impressed with how he had arranged functions. For example, Hooker
had placed athletics under student affairs, which resulted in a more constructive
relationship between athletics and the quality of student life.47
A female clerical worker who gave Finnerty and Story a ride to the airport told
them that one of the things she liked most about Hooker is that he made her feel im-
portant at the end of the workday. Perhaps of greater significance were the insights
provided by Willie Lamouse-Smith, a professor of African-American studies, who
commented: "Hooker goes out to put forward ideas and to fight with the politicians
and get us what we need to build this place. Before he came, this place was always
the whipping boy for the Baltimore papers. Nobody whips us around anymore."48 All
these accounts suggested that Hooker had good political skills when it came to deal-
ing with the news media and with the political establishment.
But on the negative side, an ethical cloud hovered over Hooker's personal fi-
nances. In another article that appeared in the Boston Globe, Anthony Flint reported
that Hooker may have improperly used money from the University of Maryland Foun-
dation for his mortgage payments, baby-sitters, and lawn furniture.49 Reacting to the
negative publicity he had received, Hooker claimed that he had done no wrong.
Acknowledging that he may have made a "political error" in spending the money for
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such purposes, he said that it had been negotiated as part of his overall compensation
package. On this sticky point, he apparently satisfied the scrutiny of the trustees as
well as the state police who had investigated the matter.
When all the various background checks had been completed, Taylor was ready to
go to the board of trustees. He asked Gordon Oakes to schedule a special meeting,
which was held on May 27. There Taylor gave a full report of the search and
thoroughly briefed his colleagues. Despite its drama, the vote of the trustees to offer
Hooker the presidency ended in anticlimax. There was little discussion. The vote was
unanimous.50 Earlier actions foretold such results, had anyone cared to notice. The
committee's unanimity meant more than most people realized.
After this meeting, Hooker held a press conference in which he spoke about the
importance of the university to the future of the state economy and its citizens. He
also announced that his first priority would be to instill public confidence in the
university, declaring: "I am convinced that one can rebuild public confidence, public
trust, and public pride." 51 At the same press conference, search consultant Ron Stead
publicly acknowledged that of the 128 searches in which his firm had been involved,
this one was by far the most efficient. The Hooker appointment became effective on
September 1, 1992.
As things turned out, the trustees offered Hooker a salary of $175,000. This figure
represented a 35 percent increase over what former president Joseph Duffey had been
paid. When all the fringe benefits were added to Hooker's base salary, the total com-
pensation package came close to $200,000. Other major public university systems
were in a similar range. To cite a few examples, Rutgers University in New Jersey,
Michigan State University, and the University of Maryland all pay their presidents
$175,000. On a somewhat higher scale, the University of Texas pays its president
$203,000, while the University of California pays its system head $307,000 (which
includes deferred compensation). When one compares these figures with those of
Hooker, his pay was competitive and not out of line.
Once information about the compensation package was released, however, it
evoked a public outcry and produced much adverse publicity, which was not unex-
pected. Newspaper editorials sternly rebuked the trustees for paying Hooker what
they considered to be an outrageous salary.52 So did some faculty members.53 Since
both faculty and staff had not received any pay raises over the past four years, the
issue was bound to be controversial. It was a no-win situation for the trustees and the
president: there was no way to rationalize his high salary in an atmosphere of
economic stagnation, high job losses, and scarce state resources. Yet, on balance, the
compensation package seemed to them justified, even if it seemed excessive to the
general public.
Gaining Perspective: Two Schools of Thought
For more than twenty years the trustees and faculty at UMass have fought over the
question of power in presidential searches. The dispute is a modern one for the
simple reason that only two decades ago, few people saw anything wrong with the
trustees unilaterally selecting a president. Before Robert Wood's time, most faculty
members accepted the premise that the appointment was the exclusive prerogative of
the trustees. In the early 1970s, faculty and students challenged that premise and
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sought to have a voice in university governance. In due course, the ideal of par-
ticipatory democracy, as enshrined in the Wellman Report, became so universally ac-
cepted that most of them believed it was a reality. If the intensity of the dispute at
UMass is unusual, the issues are essentially no different from those at other colleges
and universities.
Borrowing from the field of contemporary political theory, I think it is helpful to
analyze the recent controversy in the framework of the community power debate,
which contrasts the "power elite" approach to the study of power with the alternative
"pluralist" explanation. Those who take the elitist approach argue that there is a rela-
tively permanent "top leadership" which decides the important questions, while the
pluralists argue that any significant group in society has the capacity to win redress
of its grievances if the group feels intensely about its problems and demands action.
In a superficial way, each of these paradigms accurately describes many aspects of
the recent search.
For example, the trustees, a small group of power holders, can be identified as a
"power elite." In this case, the internal struggle for power centered primarily on the
issue of process versus product. By changing their governance policy at the outset of
the search, the trustees not only reasserted their appointing authority, but they also
diminished the power of faculty and students. All things considered, they saw their
appointment of Michael Hooker to be a judicious exercise of power in influencing
the future direction of the university. Some of them saw the search as a catalytic
event that marked a beginning of a resurgence for UMass.54
Not everyone will agree with this conclusion, but the trustees so regarded it. In
their eyes, Hooker was the right choice for the presidency. The inferences they drew
suggest some of their reasons. They saw him as being ideally suited for the job. He
not only met all their criteria, but he also symbolized consensus. As an added
dividend, he happened to be a product of the UMass system. Clearly, as the intensity
of the process built, the trustees considered outcome to be more important than
process.
On the other side, many faculty took a diametrically different stand. They fer-
vently believed that a "good process" would eventually produce a "good president."
Within this analytic framework, they can be identified as "pluralists." As such, they
wanted greater participation in the search, and on their terms. When they were denied
their rights of shared governance, as defined in the Wellman Report, they saw the
search process as being closed, secretive, undemocratic, not responsive to their con-
cerns, and leaving large discretionary power in the hands of a relatively few well-
placed people. Some faculty saw it as a rerun of the old-time old-boy network that
characterized the efforts that produced Robert Wood as president in 1970. Other mem-
bers of the university community saw the outcome as being politically predeter-
mined. In their view, the trustees had acted in a unilateral manner and had come full
cycle.
Citing classic American norms about participatory democracy and belief in the
principles of the Wellman Report, one faculty colleague, who shall remain
anonymous for obvious reasons, found that the Hooker search fell short of these
ideals. He offered the following scathing critique:
What really happened in this search is that the Trustees decided to go out and
get a new University President as quickly as possible, with as little internal
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University consultation as possible, in as much secrecy as possible, and with no
press scrutiny if it could possibly be avoided. And, in this context, they proceeded
to violate the University's faculty contract and the state's open meeting law, as
well as apparently ignoring serious ethical questions about their final selection
(arising from his immediately previous position), and in the process nevertheless
generated substantial negative publicity for the University and its new President.
And the only way they got away with it was that the University faculty was so
demoralized after previous battles that they just didn't want to put up enough ef-
fort to protect their legitimate interests.
This interpretation, for all its oversimplification and distortion of what transpired,
has an element of truth in it. By operating in secret and not allowing campus visits
by the candidates, the trustees left themselves wide open for criticism. The dispute
over secrecy and publicity, along with the closed nature of the process, became
central because it focused on a question of enduring significance about which it was
impossible to reach a satisfactory resolution. The dispute was significant because it
had important implications for the university's claim to democratic governance and
the diverse nature of the overall system.
Indeed, it posed a classic dilemma, if not a conundrum, of how to maintain con-
fidentiality while supposedly running an open operation in conformance with
statutory requirements. Yet the issue could not be resolved, because to reveal the iden-
tities of the candidates was, for all practical purposes, to jeopardize their current posi-
tions. Newspapers in particular have complained bitterly about the denial of "the
right to know," but it is not always clear whether this is the public's right to know
what is going on or the newspaper's right to have access to all meetings and
information.
If the group effort had a reasonable likelihood to succeed, the trustees were bound
to antagonize some people, no matter what they did. The faculty were miffed because
Dan Taylor had finessed them on the power question, and he did not consult with
them in advance. Though he respected their professional judgment, he concluded that
things would go better if the trustees consulted selectively. Some people felt that
Taylor tried to have it both ways, reassuring faculty that he wanted their advice while
ignoring their demands for greater participation. He understood the need to consult,
but he also understood the need to lead.
Taylor was a capable chairman whose role cannot be overestimated. He or-
chestrated and carefully monitored the search process every step of the way. Taylor's
leadership made all the participants feel that they were playing a significant part in
the collective enterprise. He elicited trust and performed well. What is more, he did
his homework. To be sure, he gave the search a real identity and strengthened that
identity by putting people of stature on the search committee. Taylor's enthusiasm
was infectious. Members felt that too. His relaxed manner and personal charm put
them at ease. He was scrupulous in seeking advice. All accounts substantially agree
on this.
Although the search committee was too large to function effectively, Taylor over-
came this handicap by relying on a small group of key members. Yet the composition
of the committee sent a clear signal that it was going to be a legitimate search. No in-
siders were going to have an inside track on an inside operation. At the same time,
the prestige of the search committee provided sufficient political insulation to keep
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the politicians at a safe distance and the search from becoming politicized. In some
quarters that was feared. Naming four sitting college and university presidents to
the committee was an innovation that gave credibility and judgment to the search.
Faculty, however, tended to see the large committee as no more than a public rela-
tions gimmick, if not a front. In their minds, the small group that Taylor relied on
diminished the representative nature of the full committe.
This brings us finally to the question of affirmative action. Despite the best of in-
tentions, the efforts of the search committee left much to be desired. None of the four
finalists, as noted, was a minority candidate. As one critic scornfully remarked, "It
doesn't take a flaming liberal to wonder why the search committee was willing to go
out of its way and to such lengths to reassure Hooker while letting a perceived nega-
tive climate for minorities go unanswered." Why did the eight minority applicants
whom they contacted not show up among the finalists? No single explanation is satis-
factory. In truth, only the candidates themselves can explain it to us.
Part of the answer, it seems to me, lies in the shallowness of the pool and the two
discernible tiers that were established. It posed the dilemma of the "glass ceiling."
When the search committee decided to limit the pool to the first tier, only white
males (and one white female) at the top or in the corner office were likely to appear.
If the pool is shallow, as it was in this case, what one gains in terms of quality one
sacrifices in terms of equality and diversity. Another part of the answer had to do
with their not considering anyone in the second tier, or at the dean level and below.
This recruitment problem, I hasten to add, is not limited to the University of Mas-
sachusetts. It applies to all colleges and universities, public or private. This is espe-
cially true in the 1990s, when higher education in America is undergoing significant
changes and the search for diverse leadership takes on new meaning and greater im-
portance.
When all this is added up, the exercise serves as a reminder that, for thinking
about presidential searches, the context of the Hooker search may be special, even
unique, for it embodied a mixture of something old and something new. In differing
ways, Taylor and his colleagues saw the search as a challenge but also as an oppor-
tunity. They did not shirk their duty, nor were they intimidated by the clamorous spec-
tacle that had occurred a year earlier.
While it is true that they spotted their man early and went after him, it is also true
that they were keenly aware of their choices and the type of leader they wanted. If
any one feature of their work has to be singled out, it would be the clear way in
which they defined the job profile. The formula was not a quick fix. More simply,
the trustees had an overwhelming desire to settle on a permanent president. With the
passing of time, we shall have a much better perspective and vantage point from
which to judge the new chief executive and his administration. The trustees them-
selves suggest that it will take at least ten years' time "to reach the end of the begin-
ning." Only then, of course, will we be able to tell whether or not this presidential
search really made a difference. ^
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